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The primary end of Government is the protection of
the persons and property of men.-Lord Macaulay
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
The modern city has a rather curious dual character.' As a
political body the municipal corporation is an organ of government
and charged with governmental functions and responsibilities. 2 On
the other hand it is an incorporated body, capable of much the
same acts as private corporations.3 This idea that municipalities
are at one and the same time a corporate entity and a govern-
mental institution has left the law in a hopeless tangle of disagree-
ment and confusion with regard to tort liability.4 The situation
has prompted the South Dakota Supreme Court to agree with the
declaration that:
On no subject, perhaps, is there more confusion among
the decisions than that of municipal liability for torts. The
rule of governmental immunity is subject to a great number
of exceptions, many of which are purely arbitrary and
without any relation to the grounds upon which the courts
please to base the general rule. The whole doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity from liability for torts rests upon a
rotten foundation. 5
In seeking solutions, American judicial expression has suggested
extreme stands.6 One pioneering suggestion was the desirability
of holding the municipality liable in tort in all cases,' and a
1. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
2. Id. at 132.
3. Id..
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 1004 (3rd ed. 1964). See also Comment, 41
N.C. L. REV. 290, 291 (1963).
5. Ring v. City of Mitchell, 64 S.D. 67, 263 N.W. 893, 894 (1935) quoting Annot., 75
A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
6. Note, Municipal Tort Liability-A Proposal, 23 IowA L. Rzv. 392, 395 (1938) [here-
inafter cited as Municipal Tort Liability].
7. Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72, 78 (1919). This case was
subsequently overruled by Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164
(1922).
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squarely opposite view was taken by the South Carolina Court in
Irvine v. City of Greenwood,8 denying recovery in all cases except
where allowed by statute. Because of the unprecedented novelty
of the former and the manifest injustice of the latter, neither has
been commonly accepted.9
The purpose of this note is to examine municipal tort liability
in North Dakota, to determine the direction the courts appear to
be headed, and to present conclusions and recommendations. Special
effort has been made to reflect the case law in North Dakota
against Chapter 40-42 of the North Dakota Century Code, "Claims
for Injuries on Streets," which is the primary section on municipal
tort liability.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Some writers assume that the origin of the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity is a direct outgrowth of the divine right of the
king who could do no wrong.10 But insofar as municipal or county
or local district communities are concerned, it is generally agreed
that the application of the immunity doctrine grew out of Russell
v. Men of Devon1 which involved a tort action against an unincor-
porated county. Among various bases for the decision in Russell
was the Court's opinion that it was better for an individual to sustain
an injury than for the public to suffer inconvenience, since the facts
established that the county was not incorporated, and thus there
was no corporate fund from which satisfaction could be made.
The doctrine of governmental immunity was first brought into
this country by Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester.12 In Mower the
county was incorporated, could sue and be sued, and there was a
corporate fund from which a judgment could be satisfied. The Massa-
chusetts Court, however, chose to ignore these differences and
adopted the rule of the Russell case which became the general
American Rule.' 3
Although the doctrine of governmental immunity had become
quite firmly established in the United States, it was not long before
the waters became clouded with the so-called distinction between
"governmental" and "proprietary" functions. The distinction between
these two functions was first declared by a New York Court in
1842.14 Under this distinction, municipalities are generally not held
8. 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
9. Muniripal Tort Liability, supra note 6, at 395.
10. Haney v. City of Lexington, 886 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964).
11. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788).
12. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
13. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457,
459 (1961).
14. Bailey v. City of New York, 4 Nill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
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liable for negligence in the discharge of their governmental func-
tions, but immunity from liability is not extended to municipalities
in the exercise of their proprietary functions. Until 1955 this dis-
tinction was still accepted in every jurisdiction except South Caro-
lina, 51 which refuses to find any common law liability at all, and
Florida,16 which holds that cities under a commission form of
government are subject to the same tort liability as private cor-
porations. In 1917 the North Dakota Supreme Court took cognizance
of the doctrine of governmental and proprietary functions when it
stated:
We are also satisfied that in disposing of its garbage
and in letting the contract in question the city of Fargo was
acting in its governmental, and not in its private or cor-
porate, capacity.17
In 1922 in Trenton v. State of New Jersey"' it was stated that:
The basis of the distinction (between governmental and
proprietary functions) is difficult to state, and there is no
established rule for the determination of what belongs to
the one or the other class. It originated with the courts. Gen-
erally it is applied to escape difficulties, in order that in-
justice may not result from the recognition of technical
defenses based upon the governmental character of such
corporations.. 19
Although there is no established rule as to which functions are
governmental and which are proprietary
it is generally accepted that police, fire and educational
functions are governmental, while the water works and light
plants are proprietary. Liability usually also attaches to
actions arising out of the functions related to streets and
sidewalks.
2 0
Considerable confusion has arisen as to which functions are to
be considered governmental and which proprietary. 21 An example
15. See Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
16. See City of Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924.).
17. Mountain v. Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416, 417 (1917).
18. 262 U.S. 182 (1922).
19. Id. at 191-92.
20. B. VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITIES OF CITIES AND SCHOOLs FOR INJURIES IN
RECREATION AND PARKS, 6, 7 (1968) [hereinafter cited as VAN DER SmIssEN]. See also
MUNICIPAL TORT LIAILrrTY, supra note 6, at 392, 394.
21. J. Spencer, Municipal Immunity for the Torts of Police Officers in South Dakota, 11
S.D. L. REV. 87, 89 n.13: "Compare Blakemore v. Cincinatti Metropolitan Housing Author-
ity, 74 Ohio App. 5, 57 N.E.2d 397 (1943) (off-street parking held governmental function)
with Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936)" (off-street parking held to
be a proprietary function). Cormpare Spellman v. Caledonia, 117 Wis. 254, 94 N.W. 27
(1903) (flood control and protection held to be a governmental function) with Bardin v.
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of the kinds of problems which would arise is found in an early
Michigan case, Hodgins v. Bay City,2 2 where the plaintiff's hus-
band was killed by contact with an electric wire. An important
factor was the type of current the wire was carrying. The deceased
was a city lineman who was working on a light pole that carried
two wires. He was killed by contact with the wire carrying alter-
nating current, which the city sold for profit. The other wire carried
direct current used to light the city streets. The court found that
selling electricity to the public was a proprietary function and held
the city liable. However, the Court also took the opportunity to
point out that the lighting of city streets was governmental, and had
the deceased come in contact with that wire there would have
been no recovery.23 The apparent lack of logic in this distinction
forecast the problems that would face courts in searching for a
base upon which to rest decisions.
In seeking a basis for distinctions courts have raised other
doctrines. Some courts have referred to the differences between
mandatory and permissive duties:
[W]here the corporation exercises powers and privileges,
which are permissive and not mandatory, . . . then the
municipality acts in a proprietary or private capacity.
24
However, most courts do not recognize the permissive-mandatory
distinction for tort liability. A governmental function is more often
determined by its character than whether the function performed
was mandatory or voluntary. It is of no consequence that the duty
may be undertaken voluntarily and not under compulsion of statute.2 5
Another distinction which has been raised is that between dis-
cretionary and ministerial duties. Where the act involves personal
deliberation, discretion or judgment, it is said to be discretionary
or judicial in nature; but if the act is absolute, certain, involving
a set task, wherein the employee is left no choice of his own it is
Portage, 79 Wis. 126, 48 N.W. 210 (1891) (flood control held to be a proprietary func-
tion). Compare Roberts v. Mayor and Alderman of Savannah, 54 Ga. App. 375, 188 S.E. 39
(1939) (operation of a public building held to be governmental) with Leeds v. Atlantic
City, 13 N.J. Misc. 868, 181 A. 892 (1935) (operation of a public building held to be pro-
prietary). Compare Hannon v. City of Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136 A. 876 (1927) (public
swimming pool held to be governmental function) with Orrison v. City of Rapid City, 76
S.D. 14-5, 74. N.W.2d 489 (1956) (public swimming pool held to be a proprietary function of
the city). Compare Chickasha v. Daniels, 123 Okla. 73, 251 P. 978 (1926) (cdeaning streets
held proprietary function) with Tulsa v. Wheetley, 187 Okla. 155, 101 P.2d 834 (1940)
(cleaning city streets held to be a governmental function). See also [C.] Tooke, The Ex-
tension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REV. 97, 102 (1932)."
22. Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909).
23. Id. at - , 121 N.W. at 276.
24. Sapula v. Young, 147 Okla. 179, 296 P. 418, 438 (1931). See also Florey v. Burling-
ton, 247 Iowa 316, 73 N.W.2d 770 (1955) ; Plasecny v. Manchester, 82 N.H. 458, 136 A. 357
(1926).
25. See VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 20, at 26-28.
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ministerial. 26 The South Dakota Court in Norberg v. Hagna,27 in
citing another case, said:
[M]unicipal corporations have certain powers which are
discretionary or judicial in character, and also certina pow-
ers which are ministerial. They will not be held liable in
damages for the manner in which they exercise in good
faith their discretionary powers of a public character, but
are liable for damages caused by their negligence when their
duties are ministerial.
28
There has been little discussion in the North Dakota Supreme
Court over what constitutes ministerial duties. However, in the case
of Montain v. Fargo29 Justice Grace, in a strong dissent, declared:
The garbage contract in question relates more parti-
cularly to the removal of garbage from private property.
• . . If the municipality, therefore, undertakes to perform
this private duty for the convenience, protection, and health
of the municipality, and considers it can do it in a better
way and manner than the private property owner could do,
in the removal of such refuse the municipality is acting
and doing such work mostly in behalf and for the conveni-
ence and comfort of the inhabitants of such city, . . . the
performance of such service by the city is not a govern-
mental but a ministerial duty. If the city . . . does the same
in a negligent manner so as to cause an injury to some
person, it cannot escape liability .... 1o
REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE
Section 40-42-01 of the North Dakota Century Code 1 deals with
the requirements of notice for municipal tort actions. It requires
that notice of the injury must be filed in the office of the city
auditor within 90 days after the happening of such injury describing
the time, place, cause and extent of the damage or injury.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that this statutory
requirement of notice is mandatory, and the presentation of adequate
notice is a condition precedent to any recovery.3 2 It has also stated
that the purpose of this requirement is to enable the governmental
body to investigate the circumstances of the injury when the evidence
is fresh and the facts are still relatively clear in the minds of the
parties and the witnesses .
3
26. Id.
27. 46 S.D. 568, 195 N.W. 438 (1923).
28. Walter v. City of Carthage, 36 S.D. 11, 153 N.W. 881, 882 (1915).
29. Mountain v. Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416 (1917).
30. Id. at 451-52, 166 N.W. at 421-22.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-01 (1968).
32. Aune v. City of Mandan, 167 N.W.2d 754, 757 (N.D. 1969).
33. Id. at 758.
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With regard to the extent of injuries, however, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has held that the notice required in making or filing
a claim is a remedial matter and the statutory provision should
be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. There must, however,
be a substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute."4 In
Hooge v. City of Milnor 5 the North Dakota Supreme Court shed
some light on what would be required for "substantial compliance"
with regard to the extent of the damage or injury. It held that
notice to a city of a death claim, which apprised the city of the
death and the circumstances which, it is claimed, caused the death,
would constitute substantial compliance. However, the court pointed
out that if the claim were for physical injury short of death, the
notice must state the extent of the injury for which compensation
is sought, which would require specific reference to the injury.
Section 40-42-04 of the North Dakota Century Code 24 states that
a claimant shall not be permitted to prove any time, place,
cause, manner, or extent of the injury differing from that specified
in the claim filed with the city. Thus in Trost v. City of Casselton"7
the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's verdict
for the plaintiff on the grounds that at the trial undisputed evidence
located the obstruction and injury 100 feet distant from the place
designated in the complaint. It should be pointed out, however, that
in the later case of Johnson v. City of Fargo8 a variance of 6 feet
was allowed with regard to the location of the place of the injury.
This would seem to indicate that since a major reason for the
requirement of notice is to allow the city an opportunity to investi-
gate, a large error may deprive the city of this opportunity whereas
a small error may still afford the city this chance while evidence
is still fresh.
Section 40-42-04 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
No action shall be maintained . . . for damages or in-
juries . . . unless it shall appear that the claim upon which
the action is brought was filed . . . nor unless the governing
body of the municipality did not audit and allow the same
within sixty days thereafter.8 9
In Aune v. City of Mandan40 the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that the purpose of this statutory period delaying the com-
34. Id. at 757-58.
35. 56 N.D. 285, 217 N.W. 163 (1927).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-04 (1968).
37. 8 N.D. 534, 79 N.W. 10-71 (1899).
38. 15 N.D. 525, 108 N.W. 243 (1906).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-02 (1968).
40. Aune v. City of Mandan, 167 N.W.2d 754 (N.D. 1969).
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mencement of an action after notice is given is to allow the govern-
mental body time to investigate the case and possibly negotiate a
settlement, rather than being subjected to the annoyance and ex-
pense of needless litigation. However, in Pyke v. City of James-
town 1 the Court held that if the city auditor fails to notify the city
council of the claim, it is a neglect of a duty which is owed to the
city and not a neglect of a duty which he owes to the claimant.
In addition to the statutory period delaying the commencement
of an action after notice is given, Section 40-42-03 of the North
Dakota Century Code4 2 provides that after notice has been filed
with the city any action maintained must be brought within six
months. The Aune case was determined on the grounds that the
plaintiff did not bring her suit within this allotted time. Aune con-
tended that the city was estopped to plead the statute of limitations
because of the alleged actions of its various agents, who the plaintiff
claimed had requested further time to study the claim. The North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, citing Sections 31-11-06 and 31-
11-05(4) of the North Dakota Century Code4 3 held that private
persons cannot waive the statutory rights given a municipality
by legislative action.
SIDEWALKS
One of North Dakota's earliest municipal tort liability actions
was the territorial case of Larson v. Grand Forks"4 which dealt
with city liability for accidents occurring on their sidewalks. In this
case the plaintiff brought suit for damages sustained when an
awning overhanging a public sidewalk fell, breaking his leg. The
Supreme Court of Dakota declared:
The defendant is a municipal corporation, and, as such,
empowered by its charter, through its officers, to provide
for keeping the sidewalks clean and free from obstructions
or accumulation, and to take charge of the streets in such
city, and it is its duty to see that they are in a condition at
all times that people may travel along the walk in perfect
safety, and that there should be no obstructions to such
41. 15 N.D. 157, 107 N.W. 859 (1906).
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-03 (1968).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-06 (1968):
When a party, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately has led another to believe a particular thing true
and to act upon such belief, he shall not be permitted to falsify it in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-05(4) (1968):
Anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his
benefit, but a law established for a public reason cannot be contra-
vened by a private agreement
44. 3 Dak 307, 19 N.W. 414 (1884).
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travel, and for this purpose it may levy and collect taxes
to defray such expenses. This duty is not confined entirely
to obstructions upon the walk, but also applies as well to
everything hanging over the walk that may render such
travel unsafe. If the city officers, or those to whom this
duty belongs and to whom it is assigned, neglect such duties,
and a person is injured in consequence of such neglect, the
city is liable for damages. This is in conformity with the
act of this territory, which provides that every person who
suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of an-
other may recover, from the person in fault, compensation
therefor in money, which is called damages.4 5 (Emphasis
added).
However, at least by 1915 North Dakota recognized two cate-
gories of city liability for sidewalk actions-one for defects in side-
walks and another for conditions accounted for by the accumulation
of snow and ice.4 6 In Anderson v. City of Jamestown 7 the Court
said:
The rules relating to the liability of a city for personal
injuries sustained on account of defects in sidewalks are well
settled in this state. There is a duty incumbent upon the
city to exercise reasonable care to make and maintain its
streets and walks reasonably safe for the purposes to which
they are respectively devoted, and for the use of persons
traveling thereon in the usual modes, by day or by night,
and who are themselves in the exercise of reasonable care.
And after the city has received notice of the existence of
a defect, an obligation arises to exercise reasonable care
to restore the street or sidewalk so that it may again be
reasonably safe for travel. . . . [A]s regards other defects,
... actual knowledge on the part of the city is not necessary
... notice may be either actual or constructive.
4
With regard to conditions caused by the accumulation of snow
and ice the Court further stated:
However, there is, in this state, no liability for injuries
sustained by reason of accumulation of snow and ice upon
a sidewalk unless actual knowledge of the defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of such sidewalk . . . was possessed
. . . 48 hours previous to such damage or injury, and actual
knowledge of the condition can in no case be presumed
from the fact of the existence of the condition, but such
knowledge must in all cases be proven as an independent
fact.
4 9
45. Id. at 313, 19 N.W. at 416.
46. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-015 (1968). The source of this statute Is Ch. 70 ,§ 1,
[1915] N.D. Sess. Laws 82.
47. 50 N.D. 531, 196 N.W. 753 (1923).
48. Id. at 535-36, 196 N.W. at 754.
49. Id.
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As might be expected, individuals have been more successful
in North Dakota in suits against cities for injuries received from
defective sidewalks than in those in which the injury was received
because of the accumulation of ice and snow upon sidewalks.
Of nine cases5" dealing with defective sidewalks, the plaintiff
recovered against the defendant city in all but two. 51 And in one of
these, Gagnier v. Fargo,52 in which the plaintiff was injured in a
fall from a bicycle caused by a defective sidewalk, the court held
that if a city permits persons to ride bicycles on their sidewalks then:
A person riding a bicycle has a right to assume that
the walk is in safe condition for pedestrians to use, and, if
he is injured when the walks are in such condition, he cannot
complain, and he must bear the loss, as he assumed the
risk.
53
Another case in which the plaintiff did not recover was Braatz
v. City of Fargo.54 In that case the plaintiff while walking along a
city sidewalk became frightened by the whistle of a bicycle rider,
and she stepped off the sidewalk into the drainage gutter, receiving
personal injuries. The North Dakota Supreme Court in citing a
New York Court of Appeals case, Beltz v .City of Yonkers, 55 stated:
It is scarcely necessary to repeat here, what has often
been said before, that a city is not responsible for every
accident that may happen in its streets resulting in personal
injury. . . . But when an accident happens by reason of
some slight defect from which danger was not reasonably
to be anticipated and which according to common experi-
ence, was not likely to happen, it is not chargeable with
negligence.5 6
Of four cases 57 involved in actions against cities for injuries
sustained as a result of icy or snow laden sidewalks, in only one
case58 has the plaintiff been successful. In Jackson v. City of Grand
50. Larson v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307, 19 N.W. 414 (1884) ; Maloney v. City of
Grand Forks, 73 N.D. 445, 15 N.W.2d 769 (1944) ; Hooge v. City of Milnor, 56 N.D. 285,
217 N.W. 163 (1927) ; Anderson v. City of Jamestown, 50 N.D. 531, 196 N.W. 753 (1923) ;
Braatz v. City of Fargo, 19 N.D. 538, 125 N.W. 1042 (1910) ; Pyke v. City of Jamestown,
15 N.D. 157, 107 N.W. 359 (1906) ; Gagnier v. Fargo, 11 N.D. 73, 88 N.W. 1030 (1902) ;
Coleman v. City of Fargo, 8 N.D. 69, 76 N.W. 1051 (1898); Chasey v. City of Fargo, 5
N.D. 173, 64 N.W. 932 (1895).
51. Braatz v. City of Fargo, 19 N.D. 538, 125 N.W. 1042 (1910) ; Gagnier v. Fargo, 11
N.D. 73, 88 N.W. 1030 (1902).
52. 11 N.D. 73, 88 N.W. 1030 (1902).
53. Id. at 78-79, 88 N.W. at 1033.
54. 19 N.D. 538, 125 N.W. 10,42 (1910).
55. 148 N.Y. 67, 42 N.E. 401 (1895).
56. Braatz v. City of Fargo, 19 N.D. 538, 125 N.W. 1042, 1043-44 (1910).
57. Malherek v. City of Fargo, 49 N.D. 522, 191 N.W. 951 (1922); Ellingson v. City of
Leeds, 40 N.D. 415, 169 N.W. 85 (1918) ; Jackson v. City of Grand Forks, 24 N.D. 601, 140
N.W. 718 (1913) ; Trost v. City of Casselton, 8 N.D. 534, 79 N.W. 1071 (1899).
58. Jackson v. City of Grand Forks, 24 N,D, 601, 140 N.W. 718 (1913).
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Forks,59 the plaintiff was allowed recovery for personal injuries
which resulted from a fall on a slippery sidewalk. In this case the
walk in question had not been cleaned at any time during the
winter and the snow and ice had been permitted to collect and
remain upon the sidewalk. Some warm weather had caused the
snow to soften and the trampling of pedestrians had caused it to
form in mounds and humps. The North Dakota Supreme Court
stated:
The general rule, and, we believe, the better rule,
is that the liability should be based upon negligence and
upon what is reasonable under the circumstances, paying
attention to the climatic conditions. . . . The municipality
under this rule is bound merely to exercise reasonable care
and diligence to render the sidewalk safe. Where the side-
walk is properly constructed, the mere fact that it is ren-
dered slippery by the presence of ice or snow will not, in
itself, render the city liable for resulting injuries. Where,
however, snow or ice is suffered to remain for a long time
until it forms into mounds or ridges, and becomes, itself,
an obstruction, as it were, to the sidewalk, . . . the munici-
pality may be held liable. It will be held liable, if not for
the accumulation, then for not using reasonable means, ...
to prevent the danger. 0
It may be of interest to point out, however, that the Jackson case
was decided in 1913, two years prior to the adoption of the statute
which declares in part:
All municipalities in this state shall be exempt from all
liability to any person for damages for injuries suffered or
sustained by reason of the accumulation of snow and ice
upon the sidewalks within the municipality unless actual
knowledge of the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
of the sidewalk . . . shall have been possessed . . . at least
forty-eight hours previous to the damage or injury.. ..
(Emphasis added).
It would appear that the language of this statute would today
preclude a recovery in a situation similar to the Jackson case. And
in Malherek v. City of Fargo62 the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that, although another individual, Mr. Loucks, testified that he
had fallen on the same icy sidewalk earlier the same day as the
plaintiff, and had reported it to the police, the statute called for
forty-eight hours actual notice.
59. 24 N.D. 601, 140 N.W. 718 (1913).
60-. Id. at 618, 140 N.W. at 728.
61. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-05 (1968). This statute was adopted by Ch. 70, § 1,
[1915] N.D. Sess. Laws 82.
62. 49 N.D. 522, 191 N.W. 951 (1922).
NOTE
STREETS
Actions against municipalities in North Dakota by individuals
seeking damages for injuries received in accidents on city streets
may be divided into three sub-categories: Obstructions; Dead End
Streets; and Operation of City Vehicles.
With regard to obstructions it was held in City of Grand Forks
v. Allman" that:
The streets of a city are made and maintained at public
expense for the use of its citizens and others who may law-
fully pass over them, and a duty is cast upon a city to
exercise all reasonable supervision, care, and precaution to
maintain them in a reasonably safe condition so as to avoid,
as far as possible, injury to the traveling public ... 64
As with sidewalk use, it has been held in North Dakota that
knowledge of an obstruction prior to an accident does not neces-
sarily preclude recovery. In Ouverson v. City of Grafton,5 where
the plaintiff was aware of the obstruction in the street prior to the
accident, the North Dakota Supreme Court, citing Turnpike Co. v.
Jackson,66 stated that one does not have to forego travel on a
highway merely because he knows it is dangerous. His knowledge
of the defect in the highway is only one circumstance to be con-
sidered with other circumstances in determining whether he used
reasonable care.
Belt v. City of Grand Forks67 concerns an action with regard to
dead end streets. In the Belt case an accident occurred at the
intersection of South Washington Street and Ninth Avenue South.
South Washington runs north and south. The streets on the east
side of South Washington do not match up with those on the west
side. Those on the west side are about ninety-seven feet north of
those on the east side. The accident happened when the plaintiff's
husband, driving west on Ninth Avenue South, drove his car straight
across South Washington and failing to notice the jog of South
Ninth Avenue, drove into a shallow ditch, with the plaintiff suffering
personal injuries. At the intersection in question there was no
highway sign indicating the necessity of a turn at the intersection
nor a dead end warning sign. The North Dakota Supreme Court
stated, however, that a city is not chargeable with liability " . .
for failure to maintain barriers, lights or warning signs or notices
at the point of an offset or jog in a street, where the same could
63. 153 IF. 532 (8th Cir. 1907).
64. Id. at 534.
65. 5 N.D. 281, 65 N.W. 676 (1895).
66. Id. at 285, 65 N.W. at 679.
67. 68 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1955).
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not constitute a dangerous situation to a prudent driver ... .
The Court maintained that it is sufficient under the ordinary stand-
ard of care for a city to maintain its streets free from defects or
from creating extraordinary or unusual hazards.
It would appear that the Court in the Belt case places too much
emphasis on whether or not a driver is prudent. In general, the
city's liability should rest upon whether the situation is dangerous
or presents an unusual hazard. It could well be that the prudence
of a driver may in part be measured by his ability to observe signs
and warnings placed upon the streets for his convenience and safety.
The last category of street actions involves the operation of a
city vehicle. In Hanson v. Berry6 9 a policeman for the city of Fargo
was charged by one Hanson of driving an automobile owned by
the city at an excessive rate of speed, about 35 miles per hour,
driving upon the left-hand side of the street without having the
vehicle under control, and with knowledge that the automobile was
unequipped with proper brakes.
The Hanson case presented the Court with two issues. With
regard to the first issue the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
a city is not liable for the negligent acts of its agent while operating
an automobile on the streets thereof when the agent is acting in
the course of performance of a governmental duty. In citing Dillon
on Municipal Corporations it stated:
Unless there be a valid contract creating, or a statute
declaring, the liability, a municipal corporation . . . is not
responsible civilly for neglect of duty on the part of its
officers in respect to their enforcement, although such neglect
results in injuries to private persons which would otherwise
not have happened .... 70
The second issue of relevance was whether the unsafe operation
of a city vehicle could render the city streets unsafe within the
meaning of statutory regulations. With regard to this matter the
Court stated:
In our opinion, a holding that a municipality is liable on
account of an unsafe condition of the streets, where such
unsafety is due to no physical imperfection, would involve
the modification of well-established principles of law. 71
68. Id. at 121.
69. 54 N.D. 4.87, 209 N.W. 1002 (1926).
70. Id. at 494, 209 N.W. at 1004-05.
71. Id. at 495, 209 N.W. at 1005.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It appears that three trends are developing in the field of
municipal tort liability. First are those jurisdictions whose courts
are claiming that municipal immunity is court made law and as
such may be changed by the courts. These jurisdictions are following
the holding in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 2 in which the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin stated:
[T]he governmental immunity doctrine has judicial origins.
. . .[W]e are now of the opinion that it is appropriate
for this court to abolish this immunity notwithstanding the
legislature's failure to adopt corrective enactments .73
Other states adopting a similar viewpoint include Arizona,7 4 Florida, 75
Kentucky, 76 Michigan, 77 Minnesota, 78 and South Dakota.
7 9
A second trend is seen in those jurisdictions in which the courts
refuse to abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity without
legislative enactment. North Dakota has strongly adopted this view-
point. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Fetzer v. Minot Park
District ° stated emphatically:
The courts cannot legislate regardless of how much we
might desire to do so. Therefore, regardless of how worthy
a claim against a municipal corporation might be, we can-
not assume the functions of the Legislative Assembly. Our
power is limited to passing on laws enacted by the Legis-
lature, and, if the Legislature fails to act, we cannot change
the law by judicial decision. . . .As was said by the Honor-
able A. M. Christianson, in his concurring opinion to Ander-
son v. Board of Education of City of Fargo, 49 N.D. 181,
190 N.W. 807: "If the rule is wrong the Legislature has
ample power to change it. It is the duty of the courts to
enforce the law as it exists." 8'
Other states agreeing with the North Dakota decision in leaving
the thorny problem to legislative action include Kansas,8 2 New
Hampshire, 3 Missouri,8 4 Ohio,
85 Pennsylvania8 and Tennessee.87
72, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
73. Id. at - , 115 N.W.2d at 623.
74. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384. 381 P.2d 10-7 (1963).
75. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
76. Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
77. Williams v. City of Detorit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
78. Spanel v. Mounds View Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
79. Bucholz v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d 606 (1958).
80. 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
81. Id. at 604.
82. Parker v. City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966).
83. Gossler v. City of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966).
84. Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963).
85. Hyde v. City of Lakewood, 2 Ohio St.2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 (1965).
86. Dillon v. New York School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966).
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The stand taken by the North Dakota Supreme Court and other
jurisdictions whose solution is to refer the problem to state legisla-
tures appears ill founded. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stated in the Holyt 88 case, the doctrine of governmental immunity
has judicial origins and courts should take the lead in its abolition.
In the absence of a specific statute declaring municipal tort im-
munity, a court's refusal to deal with the problem by referring it to
a legislature is only judicial "buckpassing". Not all state legislators
are lawyers and many are not aware nor concerned with this prob-
lem. Consequently, referral to a legislature often is just another
way of postponing any definite action. What is necessary is cou-
rageous court action which, if nothing else, may force legislatures
to deal with the issue of municipal tort immunity.
The third, and perhaps most encouraging trend is that some
state legislatures have taken it upon themselves to abrogate the
common law immunity by statute. Washington,"s Oregon, 90 Cali-
fornia, 91 and New York 2 are some states which have enacted
legislation affecting the doctrine of governmental immunity. While
not all of this legislation deals exclusively with municipal immunity,
it is at least a step forward in the battle against governmental im-
munity at all levels.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Ever since Professor Edwin Borchard's scholarly critique of
governmental tort liability,9 countless legal writers have examined
and cross-examined the governmental immunity doctrine. The criti-
cisms are wide-ranging and highly varied. Some common examples
are
that it is unfair to impose upon the individual the burden
of his damage, rather than upon the entire community
where it justly belongs; that by denying a remedy for a
wrong, the doctrine results in the deprivation of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law; and that the doc-
trine runs counter to a basic concept underlying the law of
torts, that is, that liability follows negligence. 94
Whether as a result of these criticisms or merely recognition
by the courts and legislatures that "[m]ost of the arguments for
88. Holytz V. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wls.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
89. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1966).
90. See ORE. Prv. STAT. §§ 30,.320, 30.400 (Supp. 1967-1968).
91. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-840.6, 945 (West Supp. 1966).
92. See N.Y. JUDICIARY, COURT ACTS, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT, § 8 (MeKinney 1963).
93. See E. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924) ; E. Borchard,
Governmental Responsibtlity in Tort VI, 36 YALE L. J. 1 (1926). E. Bordhard, Govern-
mental Responsibility in Tort: VII, 28 COLum. L. REV. 577 (1928).
94. Comment, 41 N.C. L. REV. 290, 291 (1963).
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governmental immunity . . . took root at a time when the activities
of a municipal corporation were exceedingly limited, . . ."9 trends
indicate that many jurisdictions are relaxing, if not eliminating,
the doctrine of municipal governmental tort immunity.
Opponents of municipal liability have made one strong argument,
claiming that municipal liability would create critical financial dif-
ficulties for small communities.9 6 This, of course, would be of great
interest to a state such as North Dakota where most of the cities
are "small". However, statistics show that the abolition of govern-
mental immunity would not increase the small municipal tort burden
more than fifteen or twenty percent. 97
The North Dakota Legislature has acted in the area of financial
liability by providing that cities may carry insurance. Section 40-43-07
of the North Dakota Century Code9 provides that political sub-
divisions may provide for liability insurance to protect themselves
against claims for loss, damage or injury. Section 39-01-0899 further
provides that a city may carry insurance on their motor vehicles
or aircraft. Both of these statutes state, however, that the city
waives its immunity only to the extent of the type and policy
limits of their insurance coverage.
In Fetzer v. Minot Park District'0 0 the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated quite emphatically that changes in the area of munici-
pal liability must come from the State Legislature. There are at
least two positive alternatives for the North Dakota Legislature.
First, as a long range goal, they could follow the example of New
Jersey'101 and establish a study commission to make a report on
municipal tort liability with the possibility of someday eliminating
municipal tort immunity. Second, even if reluctant to completely
eliminate municipal tort immunity, they could pass legislation spe-
cifically delineating which municipal functions are to be considered
governmental and which are proprietary. This would at least help
clarify in the minds of both the court and private citizens in which
areas the city may be held liable for its wrongful acts.
Some of the more progressive state legislatures have already
acted. Following the example of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
10 2
which authorizes tort claims against the federal government for
injuries caused by the wrongful acts of federal employees acting
95. Municipal Tort Liability, 8upra note 6, at 400.
96. H. Kennedy & R. Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36
S.CAL. L. REv. 161, 181 (1963).
97. G. Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
363, 367 (1942).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-43-07 (1968).
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-08 (Supp. 1969).
100. 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52: 17B-1, 52: 17B-4.2 (Supp. 1968).
102. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
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within the scope of their employment, these states have enacted
similar laws with regard to municipal tort liability. The Minnesota
legislature, for example, in reaction to the catalytic case of
Spanels v. Mounds View School Dist.,03 has wholly recodified the
law of governmental immunity 04 so that basically municipalities
would be subject to liability for their torts and the torts of their
agents acting within the scope of their employment.
0 5
The California legislature has also provided that a public entity
is liable for injury caused by the act or omission of an employee
acting within the scope of his employment. 10 6
It should be understood that in seeking clarification of municipal
liability, it is only as to those harms which are torts that the
municipality should be held liable. If indeed government is to serve
to protect persons and their property, and there is to be a "remedy
for every wrong," this is a necessity.
ROBERT W. HOLTE
103. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
104. MINN. SEss. LAWS 1963, Ch. 798.
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